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Abstract
Online reviews could, in principle, greatly improve consumers' ability to evaluate products. However,
the authenticity of online user reviews remains a concern; rms have an incentive to manufacture
positive reviews for their own products and negative reviews for their rivals. In this paper, we
marry the diverse literature on economic subterfuge with the literature on organizational form. We
undertake an empirical analysis of promotional reviews, examining both the extent to which fakery
occurs and the market conditions that encourage or discourage promotional reviewing activity.
Specically, we examine hotel reviews, exploiting the organizational dierences between two travel
websites: Expedia.com and TripAdvisor.com. While anyone can post a review on TripAdvisor, a
consumer can only post a review of a hotel on Expedia if she actually booked at least one night at
the hotel through the website. We examine dierences in the distribution of reviews for a given hotel
between TripAdvisor and Expedia. We exploit the characteristics of a hotel's neighbor. We show
that hotels with a nearby neighbor have more one- and two-star (negative) reviews on TripAdvisor
relative to Expedia. We argue that the net gains from promotional reviewing are likely to be highest
for independent hotels that are owned by single-unit owners and lowest for branded chain hotels
that are owned by multi-unit owners. Our methodology thus isolates hotels with a disproportionate
incentive to engage in promotional reviewing activity. We show that the hotel neighbors of hotels
with a high incentive to fake have more one- and two-star (negative) reviews on TripAdvisor relative
to Expedia than do hotels whose neighbors have a low incentive to fake. Furthermore, we show that
hotels with a high incentive to fake have a greater share of ve-star (positive) reviews on TripAdvisor
relative to Expedia.
1 Introduction
User-generated online reviews have become an important resource for consumers making purchase
decisions; an extensive and growing literature documents the inuence of online user reviews on the
quantity and price of transactions.1 In theory, online reviews should create producer and consumer
surplus by improving the ability of consumers to evaluate unobservable product quality. However,
one important impediment to the usefulness of reviews in revealing product quality is the possible
existence of fake or promotional online reviews. Specically, reviewers with a material interest in
consumers' purchase decisions may post reviews that are designed to inuence consumers and to
resemble the reviews of disinterested consumers. While there is a substantial economic literature
on persuasion and advertising (reviewed below), the specic context of advertising disguised as user
reviews has not been extensively studied.
The presence of undetectable (or dicult to detect) fake reviews may have at least two deleterious
eects on consumer and producer surplus. First, consumers who are fooled by the promotional
reviews may make suboptimal choices. Second, the potential presence of biased reviews may lead
consumers to mistrust reviews. This in turn forces consumers to disregard or underweight helpful
information posted by disinterested reviewers. For these reasons, the Federal Trade Commission
in the United States recently updated its guidelines governing endorsements and testimonials to
also include online reviews. According to the guidelines, a user must disclose the existence of any
material connection between himself and the manufacturer.2 Relatedly, in February 2012, the UK
Advertising Standards Authority ruled that travel review website TripAdvisor must cease claiming
that it oers honest, real, or trusted reviews from real travelers. The Advertising Standards
Authority, in its decision, held that TripAdvisor's claims implied that consumers could be assured
that all review content on the TripAdvisor site was genuine, and when we understood that might
not be the case, we concluded that the claims were misleading.3
1Much of the earliest work focused on the eect of eBay reputation feedback scores on prices and quantity sold; for
example, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002), Melnik and Alm (2002), and Resnick et al. (2006). Later work examined
the role of consumer reviews on product purchases online; for example, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), Anderson and
Magruder (2012), Berger et al. (2010), and Chintagunta et al. (2010).
2The guidelines provide the following example, An online message board designated for discussions of new music
download technology is frequented by MP3 player enthusiasts...Unbeknownst to the message board community, an
employee of a leading playback device manufacturer has been posting messages on the discussion board promoting the
manufacturer's product. Knowledge of this poster's employment likely would aect the weight or credibility of her
endorsement. Therefore, the poster should clearly and conspicuously disclose her relationship to the manufacturer to
members and readers of the message board (http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/10/091005endorsementguidesfnnotice.pdf)
3www.asa.org/ASA-action/Adjudications.
In order to examine the potential importance of these issues, we undertake an empirical analysis
of the extent to which promotional reviewing activity occurs, and the rm characteristics and market
conditions that result in an increase or decrease in promotional reviewing activity. The rst challenge
to any such exercise is that detecting promotional reviews is dicult. After all, promotional reviews
are designed to mimic unbiased reviews. For example, inferring that a review is fake because it
conveys an extreme opinion is awed; as shown in previous literature (see Li and Hitt (2008) and
Dellarocas and Wood (2007)), individuals who had an extremely positive or negative experience
with a product may be particularly inclined to post reviews. In this paper, we do not attempt to
classify whether any particular review is fake, and instead we empirically exploit a key dierence in
website business models. In particular, some websites accept reviews from anyone who chooses to
post a review while other websites only allow reviews to be posted by consumers who have actually
purchased a product through the website (or treat unveried reviews dierently from those posted
by veried buyers). If posting a review requires making an actual purchase, the cost of posting
disingenuous reviews is greatly increased. We examine dierences in the distribution of reviews for
a given product between a website where faking is dicult and a website where faking is relatively
easy.
Specically, in this paper we examine hotel reviews, exploiting the organizational dierences
between Expedia.com and TripAdvisor.com. TripAdvisor is a popular website that collects and
publishes consumer reviews of hotels, restaurants, attractions and other travel-related services.
Anyone can post a review on TripAdvisor. Expedia.com is a website through which travel is booked;
consumers are also encouraged to post reviews on the site, but a consumer can only post a review
if she actually booked at least one night at the hotel through the website in the six months prior
to the review post. Thus, the cost of posting a fake review on Expedia.com is quite high relative
to the cost of posting a fake review on TripAdvisor. Purchasing a hotel night through Expedia
requires the reviewer to undertake a credit card transaction on Expedia.com. Thus, the reviewer is
not anonymous to the website host, potentially raising the probability of detection of any fakery.4
We also explore the robustness of our results using data from Orbitz.com, where reviews can be
either veried or unveried.
We present a simple analytical model in the Appendix that examines the equilibrium levels of
4As discussed above, TripAdvisor has been criticized for not managing the fraudulent reviewing problem. TripAd-
visor recently announced the appointment of a new Director of Content Integrity. Even in the presence of substantial
content verication activity on TripAdvisor's part, our study design takes as a starting point the higher potential for
fraud in TripAdvisor's business model relative to Expedia.
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manipulation of two horizontally-dierentiated competitors who are trying to convince a consumer
to purchase their product. The model demonstrates that the cost of review manipulation (which
we relate to reputational risk) determines the amount of manipulation in equilibrium. We marry
the insights from this model to the literature on organizational form and organizational incentive
structures. Based on the model as well as on the previous literature we examine the following
hypotheses: 1) hotels with a neighbor are more likely to receive negative fake reviews than more
isolated hotels, 2) small owners are more likely to engage in review manipulation than hotels owned
by companies that own many hotel units, 3) independent hotels are more likely to engage in review
manipulation (post more fake positive reviews for themselves and more fake negative reviews for
their competitors) than branded chain hotels, and 4) hotels with a small management company are
more likely to engage in review manipulation than hotels that use a large management company.
Our main empirical analysis is akin to a dierences in dierences approach (although, unconven-
tionally, neither of the dierences is in the time dimension). Specically, we examine dierences in
the reviews posted at TripAdvisor and Expedia for dierent types of hotels. For example, consider
calculating for each hotel at each website the ratio of one- and two-star (the lowest) reviews to total
reviews. We ask whether the dierence in this ratio for TripAdvisor vs. Expedia is higher for hotels
with a neighbor within a half kilometer vs. hotels without a neighbor. Either dierence alone would
be problematic. TripAdvisor and Expedia reviews could dier due to diering populations at the
site. Possibly, hotels with and without neighbors could have dierent distributions of true quality.
However, our approach isolates whether the two hotel types' reviewing patterns are signicantly
dierent across the two sites. Similarly, we examine the ratio of one- and two-star reviews to total
reviews for TripAdvisor vs. Expedia for hotels that are close geographic neighbors of hotels with
small owners vs. large owners, close neighbors of independent hotels vs. chain-aliated hotels, and
neighbors of hotels with large management companies versus small management companies. That
is, we measure whether the neighbor of hotels with small owners fare worse on TripAdvisor than
on Expedia, for example, than the neighbors of hotels owned by large multi-unit entities. We also
measure the ratio of ve-star (the highest) reviews to total reviews for TripAdvisor vs. Expedia
for independent vs. chain hotels, hotels with small owners vs. large owners, and hotels with large
management companies versus small management companies. Thus, our empirical exercise is a
joint test of the hypotheses that promotional reviewing take place on TripAdvisor and that the
incentive to post false reviews is a function of organizational form. Our identifying assumption
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is that TripAdvisor and Expedia users do not dierentially value hotel ownership and aliation
characteristics and the ownership and aliation characteristics of neighbors. In our specications,
we control for a large number of hotel observable characteristics that could be perceived dierently
by TripAdvisor and Expedia consumers. We discuss robustness to selection on unobservables that
may be correlated with ownership and aliation characteristics.
The results are largely consistent with our hypotheses. That is, we nd that the presence of a
neighbor, neighbor characteristics (such as ownership, aliation and management structure), and
own hotel characteristics aect the measures of review manipulation. The mean hotel in our sample
has a total of 120 reviews on TripAdvisor, of which 37 are 5-star. We estimate that an independent
hotel owned by a small owner will generate an incremental 7 more fake positive Tripadvisor reviews
than a chain hotel with a large owner. The mean hotel in our sample has thirty 1- and 2-star reviews
on TripAdvisor. Our estimates suggest that a hotel that is located next to an independent hotel
owned by a small owner will have 6 more fake negative Tripadvisor reviews compared to an isolated
hotel.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the prior literature. In Section 3 we
describe the data and present summary statistics. In Section 4 we discuss the theoretical relationship
between ownership structure and the incentive to manipulate reviews. In Section 5 we present our
methodology and results, which includes main results as well as robustness checks. In Section 6 we
conclude and also discuss limitations of the paper.
2 Prior Literature
Broadly speaking, our paper is informed by the literature on the rm's strategic communication,
which includes research on advertising and persuasion. In advertising models, the sender is the rm,
and the receiver is the consumer who tries to learn about the product's quality before making a
purchase decision. In these models the rm signals the quality of its product through the amount of
resources invested into advertising (see Nelson (1974), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Kihlstrom and
Riordan (1984), Bagwell and Ramey (1994), Horstmann and Moorthy (2003)) or the advertising
content (Anand and Shachar (2009), Anderson and Renault (2006), Mayzlin and Shin (2011)).
In models of persuasion, an information sender can inuence the receiver's decision by optimally
choosing the information structure (Crawford and Sobel (1982), Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010),
and Dziuda (2011) show this in the case where the sender has private information, while Kamenica
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and Gentzkow (2011) show this result in the case of symmetric information). One common thread
between all these papers is that the sender's identity and incentives are common-knowledge. That
is, the receiver knows that the message is coming from a biased party, and hence is able to to
take that into account when making her decision. In contrast, in our paper there is uncertainty
surrounding the sender's true identity and incentives. That is, the consumer who reads a user review
on TripAdvisor does not know if the review was written by an unbiased customer or by a biased
source.
The models that are most closely related to the current research are Mayzlin (2006) and Dellaro-
cas (2006). Mayzlin (2006) presents a model of promotional chat where competing rms, as well as
unbiased informed consumers, post messages about product quality online. Consumers are not able
to distinguish between unbiased and biased word of mouth, and try to infer product quality based
on online word of mouth. Mayzlin (2006) derives conditions under which online reviews are persua-
sive in equilibrium: online word of mouth inuences consumer choice. She also demonstrates that
producers of lower quality products will expend more resources on promotional reviews. Compared
to a system with no rm manipulation, promotional chat results in welfare loss due to distortions in
consumer choices that arise due to manipulation. The welfare loss from promotional chat is lower
the higher the participation by unbiased consumers in online fora. Dellarocas (2006) also examines
the same issue. He nds that there exists an equilibrium where the high quality product invests
more resources into review manipulation, which implies that promotional chat results in welfare
increase for the consumer. Dellarocas (2006) additionally notes that the social cost of online ma-
nipulation can be reduced by developing technologies that increase the unit cost of manipulation
and that encourage higher participation by honest consumers.
The potential for biased reviews to aect consumer responses to user reviews has been recognized
in the popular press. Perhaps the most intuitive form of biased review is the situation in which a
producer posts positive reviews for its own product. In a well-documented incident, in February
2004, an error at Amazon.com's Canadian site caused Amazon to mistakenly reveal book reviewer
identities. It was apparent that a number of these reviews were written by the books' own publishers
and authors (see Harmon (2004).5 Other forms of biased reviews are also possible. For example,
rival rms may benet from posting negative reviews of each other's products. In assessing the
5Similarly, in 2009 in New York, the cosmetic surgery company Lifestyle Lift agreed to pay $300,000 to settle
claims regarding fake online reviews about itself. In addition, a web site called verr.com which hosts posts by users
advertising services for $5 (e.g.: I will drop o your dry-cleaning for $5) hosts a number of ads by people oering
to write positive or negative hotel reviews for $5.
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potential reward for such activity, it is important to assess whether products are indeed sucient
substitutes to benet from negative reviewing activity. For example, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006)
argue that two books on the same subject may well be complements, rather than substitutes, and
thus, it is not at all clear that disingenuous negative reviews for other rm's products would be
helpful in the book market. Consistent with this argument, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) nd that
consumer purchasing behavior responds less intensively to positive reviews (which consumers may
estimate are more frequently fake) than to negative reviews (which consumers may assess to be
more frequently unbiased). However, there are certainly other situations in which two products are
strong substitutes; for example, in this paper, we hypothesize that two hotels in the same location
are generally substitutes.6
A burgeoning computer science literature has attempted to empirically examine the issue of
fakery by creating textual analysis algorithms to detect fakery. For example, Ott et al. (2011) create
an algorithm to identify fake reviews. The researchers hired individuals on the Amazon Mechanical
Turk site to write persuasive fake hotel reviews. They then analyzed the dierences between the
fake 5-star reviews and truthful 5-star reviews on TripAdvisor to calibrate their psycholinguistic
analysis. They found a number of reliable dierences in the language patterns of the fake reviews.
One concern with this approach is that it is possible that the markers of fakery that the researchers
identify are not representative of dierently-authored fake reviews. For example, the authors nd
that truthful reviews are more specic about spatial congurations than are the fake reviews.
However, the authors specically hired fakers who had not visited the hotel. We can not, of course,
infer from this nding that fake reviews on TripAdvisor authored by a hotel employee would in fact
be less specic about spatial congurations than true reviews. Since we are concerned with fake
reviewers with an economic incentive to mimic truthful reviewers, it is an ongoing challenge for
textual analysis methodologies to provide durable mechanisms for detecting fake reviews.7 Some
other examples of papers that use textual analysis to determine review fakery are Jindal and Liu
(2007), Hu et al. (2012), and Mukherjee and Glance (2012).
Kornish (2009) uses a dierent approach to detect review manipulation. She looks for evidence
of double voting in user reviews. That is, one strategy for review manipulation is to post a fake
positive review for one's product and to vote this review as helpful. That is, Kornish (2009) uses
6In theory, a similar logic applies to the potential for biased reviews of complementary products (although this
possibility has not, to our knowledge, been discussed in the literature). For example, the owner of a breakfast
restaurant located next door to a hotel might gain from posting a disingenuous positive review of the hotel.
7One can think of the issue here as being similar to the familiar arms race between spammers and spam lters.
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a correlation between review sentiment and usefulness votes as an indicator of manipulation. This
approach isolates one possible type of review manipulation and is vulnerable to the critique that
there may be other (innocent) reasons for a correlation between review sentiment and usefulness
votes: if most people who visit a product's page are positively inclined towards the product, the
positive reviews may be on average considered to be more useful.
Previous literature has not examined the extent to which the design of websites that publish
consumer reviews can discourage or encourage manipulation. In this paper, we exploit those dier-
ences in design by examining Expedia versus TripAdvisor. The literature also has not empirically
tested whether manipulation is more pronounced in empirical settings where it will be more bene-
cial to the producer. Using data on organizational form, quality, and competition, we examine the
relationship between online manipulation and market factors which may increase or decrease the
incentive to engage in online manipulation. We will detail our methodology below; however, it is
important to understand that our methodology does not rely on identifying any particular review
as unbiased (real) or promotional (fake).
Of course, for review manipulation to make economic sense, online reviews must play a role
in consumer decision-making. Substantial previous research establishes that online reviews aect
consumer purchase behavior (see, for example, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) and Luca (2012)).
There is less evidence specic to the travel context. Vermeulen and Seegers (2009) measure the
impact of online hotel reviews on consumer decision-making in an experimental setting with 168
subjects. They show that online reviews increase consumer awareness of lesser-known hotels and
positive reviews improve attitudes towards hotels. Similarly, Ye et al. (2010) use data from a major
online travel agency in China to demonstrate a correlation between traveler reviews and online sales.
3 Data
User generated Internet content has been particularly important in the travel sector. In particular,
TripAdvisor-branded websites have more than 50 million unique monthly visitors and contain over
60 million reviews. While our study uses the US site, TripAdvisor branded sites operate in 30
countries. As Scott and Orlikowski (2012) point out, by comparison, the travel publisher Frommer's
sells about 2.5 million travel guidebooks each year. While TripAdvisor is primarily a review site,
transactions-based sites such as Expedia and Orbitz also contain reviews.
Our data derive from multiple sources. First, we identied the 25th to 75th largest US cities
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(by population) to include in our sample. Our goal was to use cities that were large enough to
t many hotels, but not so large and dense that competition patterns among the hotels would
be dicult to determine.8 In October of 2011, we scraped data on all hotels in these cities
from TripAdvisor and Expedia. TripAdvisor and Expedia were co-owned at the time of our data
collection activities but maintained separate databases of customer reviews at the two sites. As
of December 2011, TripAdvisor derived 35 percent of its revenues from click-through advertising
sold to Expedia.9 Thus, 35 percent of TripAdvisor's revenue derived from customers who visited
Expedia's site immediately following their visit to the TripAdvisor site.
Some hotels are not listed on both sites, and some hotels do not have reviews on one of the
sites (typically, Expedia). At each site, we obtained the text and star values of all user reviews, the
identity of the reviewer (as displayed by the site), and the date of the review. We also obtained
data from Smith Travel Research, a market research rm that provides data to the hotel industry
(www.str.com). To match the data from STR to our Expedia and TripAdvisor data, we use name
and address matching. Our data consist of 2931 hotels matched between TripAdvisor, Expedia,
and STR with reviews on both sites. Our biggest hotel city is Atlanta with 160 properties, and our
smallest is Toledo, with 10 properties.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for review characteristics, using hotels as the unit of ob-
servation, for the set of hotels that have reviews on both sites. Unsurprisingly, given the lack of
posting restrictions, there are more reviews on TripAdvisor than on Expedia. On average, our hotels
have nearly three times the number of reviews on TripAdvisor as on Expedia. Also, the summary
statistics reveal that on average, TripAdvisor reviewers are more critical than Expedia reviews. The
average TripAdvisor star rating is 3.52 versus 3.95 for Expedia. Based on these summary statis-
tics, it appears that hotel reviewers are more critical than reviewers in other previously studied
contexts. For example, numerous studies document that eBay feedback is overwhelmingly positive.
Similarly, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) report average reviews of 4.14 out of 5 at Amazon and 4.45
at barnesandnoble.com for a sample of 2387 books.
Review characteristics are similar if we use reviews, rather than hotels as the unit of observation.
8We dropped Las Vegas, as these hotels tend to have an extremely large number of reviews at both sites relative
to hotels in other cities; these reviews are often focused on the characteristics of the casino rather than the hotel.
Many reviewers may legitimately, then, have views about a characteristic of the hotel without ever having stayed at
the hotel.
9Based on information in S-4 form led by Tripadvisor and Expedia with SEC on July 27, 2011 (see
http://ir.tripadvisor.com/secling.cfm?lingID=1193125-11-199029&CIK=1526520)
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119.58 172.37 1 1675
Number of Expedia
reviews
42.16 63.24 1 906
Average TripAdvisor
star rating
3.52 0.75 1 5
Average Expedia star
rating







Share of Expedia 1-star
reviews
0.07






Share of Expedia 5-star
reviews
0.44
Total number of hotels 2931
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for user reviews for 2931 hotels with reviews at both
TripAdvisor and Expedia collected in October of 2011.
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Our data set consists of 350,485 TripAdvisor reviews and 123,569 Expedia reviews. Of all reviews,
8.0% of TripAdvisor reviews are 1s, 8.4% are 2s, and 38.1% are 5s. For Expedia, 4.7% of all review
are 1s, 6.4% are 2s, and 48.5% of all reviews are 5s. Note that these numbers dier from the
numbers in Table 1 because hotels with more reviews tend to have better reviews. Thus, the share
of all reviews that are 1s or 2s is lower than the mean share of 1-star reviews or 2-star reviews
for hotels. Since the modal review on TripAdvisor is a 4-star review, in most of our analyses we
consider negative reviews to be 1- or 2-star reviews.
We use STR to obtain the hotel location; we assign each hotel a latitude and longitude designator
and use these to calculate distances between hotels of various types. These locations are used to
determine whether or not a hotel has a neighbor.
Importantly, we use STR data to construct the various measures of organizational form that
we use for each hotel in the data set. We consider the ownership, aliation, and management of a
hotel. A hotel's aliation is the most observable attribute of a hotel to a consumer. Specically,
a hotel can have no aliation (an independent) or it can be a unit of a branded chain. In our
data, 17% of hotels do not have an aliation. The top 5 parent companies of branded chain hotels
in our sample are: Marriott, Hilton, Choice Hotels, Intercontinental, and Best Western. However,
an important feature of hotels is that aliation is very distinct from ownership. A chain hotel
unit can be a franchised unit or a company-owned unit. In general, franchising is the primary
organizational form for the largest hotel chains in the US. For example, International Hotel Group
(Holiday Inn) and Choice Hotels are made up of more than 99% franchised units. Within the
broad category of franchised units, there is a wide variety of organizational forms. STR provides
us with information about each hotel's owner. The hotel owner (franchisee) can be an individual
owner-operator or a large company. For example, Archon Hospitality owns 41 hotels in our focus
cities. In Memphis, Archon owns two Hampton Inns (an economy brand of Hilton), a Hyatt, and a
Faireld Inn (an economy brand of Marriott). Typically, the individual hotel owner (franchisee) is
the residual claimant for the hotel's prots, although the franchise contract generally requires the
owner to pay a share of revenues to the parent brand. Furthermore, while independent hotels do
not have a parent brand, they are in some cases operated by large multi-unit owners. In our sample,
16% of independent hotels and 34% of branded chain hotels are owned by a multi-unit owners. Thus
aliation and ownership are distinct attributes of a hotel.
Owners often, though not always, subcontract day to day management of the hotel to a man-
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agement company. Typically, the management company charges 3 to 5 percent of revenue for this
service, although agreements which involve some sharing of gross operating prots have become
more common in recent years.10 In some cases, the parent brand operates a management company.
For example, Marriott provides management services for approximately half of the hotels not owned
by Marriott but operated under the Marriott nameplate. Like owners, management companies can
manage multiple hotels under dierent nameplates. For example, Crossroads Hospitality manages
29 properties in our data set. In Atlanta, they manage a Hyatt, a Residence Inn (Marriott's longer
term stay brand), a Doubletree, and a Hampton Inn (both Hilton brands). While a consumer can
clearly observe a hotel's aliation, the ownership and management structure of the hotel are more
dicult to infer for the consumer.
In constructing variables, we focus both on the characteristics of a hotel and characteristics of
the hotel's neighbors. Table 2 provides summary measures of the hotel's own characteristics. We
construct dummies for whether a hotel's aliation is independent (vs. part of a branded chain). We
also construct a dummy for whether the hotel has a multi-unit owner. For example, chain-aliated
hotels that are not owned by a franchisee but owned by the parent chain will be characterized as
owned by a multi-unit ownership entity, but so will hotels that are owned by a large multi-unit
franchisee. In our data, the modal hotel is a chain member, but operated by a small owner. For
some specications, we will also include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the hotel
is operated by a large multi-unit management company. This is the case for 35% of independent
hotels and for 55% of branded chain hotels in our data.
We then characterize the neighbors of the hotels in our data. The summary statistics for these
measures are in Table 3. That is, for each hotel in our data, we rst construct a dummy variable that
takes the value of one if that hotel has a neighbor hotel within 0.5km. As the summary statistics
show, 76% of the hotels in our data have a neighbor. We next construct a dummy that takes the
value of one if a hotel has a neighbor hotel that is an independent. Obviously, this set of ones is a
subset of the previous measure; 31% of all of the hotels in our data have an independent neighbor.
We also construct a dummy for whether the hotel has a neighbor that is owned by a multi-unit
owner. In our data 49% of the hotels have a neighbor owned by a multi-unit owner company. For
some specications, we also examine the management structure of neighbor hotels. We construct
a variable that takes the value of one if a hotel has a neighbor hotel operated by a multi-unit
10See O'Fallon and Rutherford (2010).
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Independent 0.17 1.00 0.00
Marriott Corporation Aliate 0.14 0.00 0.17
Hilton Worldwide Aliate 0.12 0.00 0.15




Best Western Company Aliate 0.04 0.00 0.04
Multi-unit owner 0.31 0.16 0.34
Multi-unit management company 0.52 0.35 0.55
Multi-unit owner AND multi-unit
management company
0.26 0.12 0.29
Total Hotels in Sample = 2931
Notes: Table shows summary information about brand aliation, ownership, and management
characteristics for 2931 hotels sampled with reviews at TripAdvisor and Expedia.
management entity, which is the case for 59% of hotels in our sample.
In our specications, we will be measuring the dierence between a hotel's reviews on Tri-
pAdvisor and Expedia. The explanatory variables of interest are the neighbor characteristics, the
ownership and aliation status, and the ownership and aliation status of the neighbors. However,
it is important that our specications also include a rich set of observable hotel characteristics to
control for the possibility that TripAdvisor and Expedia users value hotels with dierent character-
istics dierently. We obtain a number of characteristics. First, we include the ocial hotel rating
for the hotel. At the time of our study, these ocial ratings were reported in common by TripAdvi-
sor and Expedia and are based on the amenities of the hotel. From STR, we obtain a dierent hotel
classication system; hotels are categorized as Economy Class, Luxury Class, Midscale Class,
Upper Midscale Class, Upper Upscale Class and Upscale Class. We use dummy variables to
represent these categories in our specications. We also obtain the year built from STR and use
it to construct a hotel age variable (censored at 100 years old). Using STR categorizations, we also
construct dummy variables for all suites hotels, convention hotels, and a dummy that takes the
value of one if the hotel contains at least one restaurant. Even within the same city, hotels have
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Table 3: Hotel Characteristics of Neighbor Hotels Within 0.5 km Radius













Hotel has a multi-unit
owner neighbor
0.49 0.52 0.49




Notes: Table shows summary characteristics of neighbors within 0.5km of the 2931 hotels in the sample.
dierent location types. In all of our specications, we include dummies for airport locations, resort
locations, and interstate/suburban locations, leaving urban locations as the excluded type.
4 Theoretical Relationship between Ownership Structure and Re-
view Manipulation
Previous literature on promotional reviewing (see Mayzlin (2006), Dellarocas (2006)) models review
generation as a mixture of unbiased reviews and reviews surreptitiously generated by competing
rms. The consumer, upon seeing a review, must discount the information taking into account the
equilibrium level of review manipulation.
In the Appendix we present a simple model that is closely related to the previous models of
promotional reviews but also allows the cost of review manipulation to dier across rms, a new key
element in the current context. In the model rms engage in an optimal level of review manipulation
(which includes both fake positive reviews for self and fake negative reviews for competitors). The
cost of review manipulation is related to the probability of getting caught, which in turn increases
in each fake review that is posted. This model yields the following intuitive result: an increase in
the rm's cost of review manipulation decreases the amount of manipulation in equilibrium. Note
that this also implies that if the rm's competitor has lower cost of review manipulation, the rm
will have more negative manufactured reviews.
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The model reects the fact that in practice the primary cost of promotional reviews from the
rm's perspective is the risk that the activity will be publicly exposed. The penalties that an
exposed rm faces range from government nes, possibility of lawsuits, and penalties imposed by
the review-hosting platform. We use the literature on reputational incentives and organizational
form to argue that this cost is also aected by the size of the entity. In this regard, our analysis is
related to Blair and Lafontaine (2005) and Jin and Leslie (2009) who examine the incentive eects of
reputational spillovers among co-branded entities. Our analysis is also related to Pierce and Snyder
(2008), Bennett et al. (forthcoming), and Ji and Weil (2009). Bennett et al. (forthcoming) show
that competition leads vehicle inspectors to cheat and pass vehicles that ought to fail emissions
testing. Pierce and Snyder (2008) show that larger chains appear to curb cheating behavior from
their inspectors; inspectors at a large chain are less likely to pass a given vehicle than are inspectors
who work for independent shops. Similarly, Ji and Weil (2009) show that company-owned units of
chains are more likely to adhere to labor standards laws than are franchisee-owned units. While
our analysis is related to this prior literature, we exploit the rich dierences in organizational form
(chain vs. independent, large owner vs. small owner, and large management company vs. small
management company) particular to the hotel industry.
Before we formulate our hypotheses on the eect of entity size on review manipulation, we note
a few important details on the design of travel review sites. In particular, note that reviews on these
sites are hotel-specic, rather than chain or owner specic. That is, a Hampton Inn in Cambridge,
MA has unique reviews, distinct from the reviews of a Hampton Inn in Atlanta, GA. If one wants
to enhance the reputation of both hotels positively, one must post positive reviews of both hotels
separately on the site. If one wants to improve the attractiveness of these hotels relative to their
neighbors, one must post negative reviews for the individual neighbors of each hotel separately on
the site. These design features make it unlikely that reviews would generate positive reputational
spillovers across hotels - that a fake review by one unit of a multi-unit entity is more productive
because it creates positive reputational spillovers for other units in the entity. Note also that while
the presence of positive spillovers is conceivable in the case of chain-aliated hotel posting positive
fake reviews about itself (an improved customer review at one Hampton Inn, for example, could
possibly benet another Hampton Inn), it seems very unlikely in the case of the ownership variable
since co-ownership is not visible to the customers. Thus, it seems inconceivable that a positive review
for, say, Archon Hospitality's Memphis Faireld Inn would improve the reputation of its Memphis
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Hampton Inn. Positive spillovers are also less likely to arise in the case of negative competitor
reviews. Posting a negative review of one hotel will likely only benet that hotel's neighbors, not
other hotels throughout the chain.
In contrast to the discussion above, there are sizable negative spillovers associated with pro-
motional reviews. Each incremental promotional review posted increases the probability of getting
caught. A larger entity suers a greater penalty from being caught undertaking fraudulent activities
due to negative spillovers across various units of the organization. Specically, if an employee of
a multi-unit entity gets caught posting or soliciting fake reviews, any resulting government action,
lawsuit, or retribution by the review site will implicate the entire organization. Because of this
spillover, many larger entities have social media policies, constraining the social media practices
of employees or franchisees.11
To make this concrete: suppose that the owner of Archon Hospitality, which owns 41 hotels in
our sample under various nameplates, were contemplating posting a fake positive review about an
Archon Hotel. As discussed above, the benet of the fake review would likely only accrue to the one
hotel about which the fake review was posted. To benet another hotel, another fake review would
have to be posted. However, the probability of getting caught increases in each fake review that is
posted. If the owner of Archon were caught posting a fake review about one hotel, the publicity
and potential TripAdvisor sanctions would spill over to all Archon hotels. Hence the cost of posting
a fake review increases in the number of hotels in the ownership entity, but the benet of doing so
does not.
This mechanism is also demonstrated in a recent case. The Irish hotel Clare Inn Hotel and Suites,
part of the Lynch Hotel Group, was given the red badge by TripAdvisor warning customers that
the hotel manipulated reviews after it was uncovered that a hotel executive solicited positive reviews.
TripAdvisor also removed reviews from other Lynch Hotel Group hotels, and the treatment of Lynch
Hotel Group was covered by news media in Ireland. Although the Lynch Hotel Group hotels are
not co-branded under a common nameplate, TripAdvisor took action against the whole hotel group
given the common ownership and management of the hotels.12 Thus, the key assumption underlying
our ownership/aliation specications is that the reputational benet of posting a fake review only
accrues to one hotel, while the cost of posting the fake review (getting caught) multiplies in the
11For example, Hyatt's social media policy instructs Hyatt employees to Avoid commenting on Hyatt...only certain
authorized individuals may use social media for Hyatt as business purposes...your conduct may reect upon the Hyatt
brand. (http://www.constangy.net/nr_images/hyatt-hotels-corporation.pdf, accessed April 10 2013).
12http://www.independent.ie/national-news/hotel-told-sta-to-fake-reviews-on-TripAdvisor-2400564.html
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number of hotels in the ownership or aliation entity. Hence smaller entities have a bigger incentive
to post fake reviews. In terms of our model, the larger entity bears a higher δ and γ, and hence will
fake fewer reviews in equilibrium based on Proposition 1.
There is an additional incentive issue that applies specically to ownership and works in the
same direction as the mechanism that we highlight. Drawing on the literature on the separation of
ownership and control, we hypothesize that owner-operated hotels have a greater incentive to engage
in review manipulation (either positively for themselves or negatively for their neighbors). Owner-
operators are residual claimants of hotel protability and employee-operators are not. Thus, owner-
operators would have more incentive to post fake reviews because owner-operators have sharper
incentives to generate hotel protability. An employee of a large ownership entity would have
little to gain in terms of direct prot realization from posting fake reviews but would risk possible
sanctions from the entity for undertaking fake reviewing activity.
In our paper, we consider the dierential incentives of multi-unit entities using three measures
of entity type. First, we consider ownership entities that are large multi-unit owners versus small
owners. For example, this measure captures the distinction between an owner-operator Hampton Inn
versus a Hampton Inn owned by a large entity such as Archon Hospitality. Our ownership hypotheses
suggest that an owner-operator will have more incentive to post promotional reviews than will an
employee of a large entity. Second, we consider independent hotels versus hotels operating under
a common nameplate. As discussed above, aliation is a distinct characteristic from ownership;
independent hotels can be owner-operated but can also be owned by a large ownership entity. We
hypothesize that units of branded hotels will have less incentive to post promotional reviews than will
independents. As discussed above, brand organizations actively discourage promotional reviewing
by aliates (with the threat of sanctions) because of the chain-wide reputational implications of
being caught. Third, we consider management by a large management company versus management
by a smaller entity. Again in this case, a review posted by the entity will benet only one unit in
the entity while the cost of being caught can conceivably spill over to the entire entity. Unlike
owners, hotel management companies are not residual claimants and unlike franchise operations,
do not always engage in prot-sharing. Thus, while we examine hotel management companies in
our analysis, it is less clear that they have a strong enough stake in the hotel to inuence reviewing
behavior.
In summary, we argue that the ownership and aliation structure of the hotel aects the costs
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of the promotional reviewing activity, which in turn aects the equilibrium level of manufactured
reviews. Specically, based on our simple model and the discussion above, we make the following
three theoretical claims:
1. A rm that is located close to a competitor will have more fake negative reviews than a rm
with no close neighbors.
2. A rm that is part of a smaller entity will have more positive fake reviews.
3. A rm that is located close to a smaller entity competitor will have more fake negative reviews.
5 Methodology and Results
As Section 3 describes, we collect reviews from two sites, TripAdvisor and Expedia. There is a
key dierence between these two sites which we utilize in order to help us identify the presence
of review manipulation: while anybody can post a review on TripAdvisor, only those users who
purchased the hotel stay on Expedia in the past six months can post a review for the hotel.13 This
implies that it is far less costly for a hotel to post fake reviews on TripAdvisor versus posting fake
reviews on Expedia; we expect that there would be far more review manipulation on TripAdvisor
than on Expedia. In other words, a comparison of the dierence in the distribution of reviews for
the same hotel could potentially help us identify the presence of review manipulation. However, we
can not infer promotional activity from a straightforward comparison of reviews for hotels overall
on TripAdvisor and Expedia since the population of reviewers using TripAdvisor and Expedia may
dier; the websites dier in characteristics other than reviewer identity verication.
Here we take a dierences in dierences approach (although, unconventionally, neither of our dif-
ferences are in the time dimension): for each hotel, we examine the dierence in review distribution
across Expedia and TripAdvisor and across dierent neighbor and ownership/aliation conditions.
We use the claims of Section 4 to argue that the incentives to post fake reviews will dier across
dierent neighbor and ownership/aliation conditions. That is, we hypothesize that hotels with
greater incentive to manipulate reviews will post more fake positive reviews for themselves and more
13Before a user posts a review on TripAdvisor, she has to click on a box that certies that she has no personal
or business aliation with this establishment, and have not been oered any incentive or payment originating the
establishment to write this review. In contrast, before a user posts a review on Expedia, she must log in to the site,
and Expedia veries that the user actually purchased the hotel within the required time period.
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fake negative reviews for their hotel neighbors on TripAdvisor, and we expect to see these eects in
the dierence in the distributions of reviews on TripAdvisor and Expedia.






= XijB1 + OwnAf ijB2 + Nei ijB3+
NeiOwnAf ijB4 +
∑
γj + εij (1)
This specication estimates correlates of the dierence between the share of reviews on TA that
are N star and the share of reviews on Expedia that are N star for hotel i in city j. Our primary
interest will be in the most extreme reviews, 1-star/2-star and 5-star. Xij contains controls for
hotel characteristics; these hotel characteristics should only matter to the extent that TripAdvisor
and Expedia customers value them dierentially. Specically, as discussed above, we include the
hotel's ocial star categorization common to TripAdvisor and Expedia, dummies for the six
categorizations of hotel type provided by STR (economy, midscale, luxury, etc.), hotel age, location
type dummies (airport, suburban, etc), and dummies for convention hotels, the presence of a hotel
restaurant, and all suites hotels. Neiij is an indicator variable indicating the presence of a neighbor
within 0.5km. OwnAfij contains the own-hotel ownership and aliation characteristics. In our
primary specications, these include the indicator variable for independent and the indicator variable
for membership in a large ownership entity. NeiOwnAf ij contains the variables measuring the
ownership and aliation characteristics of other hotels within 0.5km. Specically, we include an
indicator variable for the presence of an independent neighbor hotel, and an indicator variable for
the presence of a neighbor hotel owned by a large ownership entity. The variables γj are indicator
variables for city xed eects.
Our cleanest specications examine the eect of Neiij and NeiOwnAf ij variables on review
manipulation. Following Claim 1 in Section 4, we hypothesize that a hotel with at least one neighbor
will have more fake negative reviews (have a higher share of 1-star/2-star reviews on TripAdvisor
than on Expedia) than a hotel with no neighbor. In addition, using Claim 3 from Section 4, we
hypothesize that the neighbor eect will be exacerbated when the rm has an independent neighbor,
and that the neighbor eect will be mitigated when the rm has a multi-unit owner or multi-unit
management company neighbor.
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We then turn to the eects of own-hotel organizational and ownership characteristics (OwnAfij)
on the incentive to manipulate reviews. Following the discussion in Section 4, we hypothesize that
an entity that is associated with more properties has more to lose from being caught manipulating
reviews: the negative reputational spillovers are higher. Hence, we claim that 1) independent hotels
have a higher incentive to post fake positive reviews (have a higher share of 5-star reviews on
TripAdvisor versus Expedia) than branded chain hotels, 2) small owners have a higher incentive to
post fake positive reviews than multi-unit owner hotels, 3) hotels with a small management company
have a higher incentive to post fake positive reviews than hotels that use multi-unit management
company.
Our interpretation of these results relies on our maintained assumption that TripAdvisor and
Expedia users value hotels with dierent ownership and aliation characteristics similarly. An
important alternative explanation for our results is that there are important dierences in tastes of
TripAdvisor and Expedia users for unobserved characteristics that are correlated with our ownership
and neighbor variables. For example, one explanation for a nding that independent hotels have a
higher share of positive reviews on TripAdvisor is that the TripAdvisor population likes independent
hotels more than the Expedia population. We discuss this alternative hypothesis at length in the
robustness section below. Here we note that this alternative explanation is much more plausible a
priori for some of our results than for others. In particular, we nd the alternative hypothesis less
plausible for the specications for which the neighbor variables are the variables of interest. For
the neighbor specications, the alternative hypothesis suggests that, for example, some consumers
will systematically dislike a Faireld Inn whose neighbor is an owner-operated Days Inn relative to
a Faireld Inn whose neighbor is a Days Inn owned by a large entity like Archon, and that this
dierence in preferences is measurably dierent for TripAdvisor and Expedia users.
Note that our empirical methodology is similar to the approach undertaken in the economics
literature on cheating. The most closely related papers in that stream are Duggan and Levitt (2002),
Jacob and Levitt (2003), and Dellavigna and Ferrara (2010). In all three papers the authors do not
observe rule-breaking or cheating (throwing sumo wrestling matches, teachers cheating on student
achievement tests, or companies trading arms in embargoed countries) directly. Instead, the authors
infer that rule-breaking occurs indirectly. That is, Duggan and Levitt (2002) document a consistent
pattern of outcomes in matches that are important for one of the players, Jacob and Levitt (2003)
infer cheating from consistent patterns test answers, and Dellavigna and Ferrara (2010) infer arms
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embargo violations if weapon-making companies' stocks react to changes in conict intensity. In all
of these papers we see that cheaters respond to incentives. Importantly for our paper, Dellavigna
and Ferrara (2010) show that a decrease in reputation costs of illegal trades results in more illegal
trading. Our empirical methodology is similar to this previous work. First, we also do not observe
review manipulation directly and must infer it from patterns in the data. Second, we hypothesize
and show that the rate of manipulation is aected by dierences in reputation costs for players
in dierent conditions. The innovation in our work is that by using two dierent platforms with
dramatically dierent costs of cheating we are able to have a benchmark.
5.1 Main Results
In this Section we present the estimation results of the basic dierences in dierences approach
to identify review manipulation. Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of Equation (1).
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used throughout.
We rst consider to the specication where the dependent variable is the dierence in the share








our measure of negative review manipulation. We begin with the simplest specication: we examine
the dierence between negative reviews on TripAdvisor and Expedia for hotels that do and do not
have neighbors within 0.5km. This specication includes all of the controls for hotel characteristics
(Xij in Equation 1), but does not include the OwnAf ij and NeiOwnAf ij characteristics. The
results are in Column 1 of Table 4. The results show a strong and statistically signicant eect of
the presence of a neighbor on the dierence in negative reviews on TripAdvisor vs. Expedia. The
coecient estimate suggests that hotels with a neighbor have an increase of 1.9 percentage points
in the share of 1-star and 2-star reviews across the two sites. This is a large eect given that the
average share of 1- and 2-star reviews is 25% for a hotel on TripAdvisor.
We continue with our analysis of negative reviews by examining ownership and aliation char-
acteristics. We include in the specication all of the own hotel ownership characteristics and the
neighbor owner characteristics (OwnAfij and NeiOwnAf ij). For these negative review manipu-
lation results, we do not expect to see any eects of the hotel's own organizational structure on
its share of 1- and 2-star reviews since a hotel is not expected to negatively manipulate its own
ratings. Instead, our hypotheses concern the eects of the presence of neighbor hotels on negative
review manipulation. The results are in Column 2 of Table 4. As before, our coecient estimates
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Table 4: Estimation Results of Equation 1
Dierence in share
of 1- and 2-star
reviews
Dierence in share
of 1- and 2-star
reviews
Dierence in share
of 5- star reviews































































Num. of observations 2931 2931 2931
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.12
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Regression estimates of Equation (1).
The dependent variable in all specications is the share of reviews that are N star for a given hotel
at TripAdvisor minus the share of reviews for that hotel that are N star at Expedia.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All neighbor eects calculated for neighbors
within a 0.5km radius.
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suggest that the presence of any neighbor within 0.5km signicantly increases the dierence in the
1- and 2-star share across the two sites. We hypothesize that multi-unit owners bear a higher cost
of review manipulation and thus will engage in less review manipulation. Our results show that
the presence of a multi-unit owner hotel within 0.5km results in 2.5 percentage point decrease in
the dierence in the share of 1- and 2-star reviews across the two sites, relative to having only
single-unit owner neighbors. This negative eect is statistically dierent from zero at the 1 percent
condence level. As expected, the hotel's own ownership and aliation characteristics do not have
a statistically signicant relationship to the presence of 1-star and 2-star reviews. The presence of
an independent hotel within 0.5km results in an additional increase of 1.7 percentage point in the
dierence in the share of 1-star and 2-star reviews across the two sites. Our point estimates imply
that having an independent neighbor versus having no neighbor results in a 4.7 percentage point
increase in and 1- and 2 star reviews (3.0 percentage points for having any neighbor plus 1.7 for the
neighbor being independent). These estimated eects are large given that the average share of 1-
and 2-star reviews is 25% for a hotel on TripAdvisor.
Of course, the neighbor characteristics are the characteristics of interest in the 1- and 2-star
review specications. However, our specications include the hotel's own ownership characteristics
as control variables. The estimated coecients for the hotel's own ownership characteristics are small
in magnitude and statistically insignicant. This is consistent with our manipulation hypotheses
but seem inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis of dierences in preferences for ownership
characteristics across TripAdvisor and Expedia users.
We next turn to the specication where the dependent variable is the dierence in the share







. This is our
measure of possible positive review manipulation. Consistent with our hypothesis that independent
hotels optimally post more positive fake reviews, we see that independent hotels have 2.4 percentage
points higher dierence in the share of 5-star reviews across the two sites than branded chain hotels.
This eect is statistically dierent from zero at the ve percent condence level. Since hotels on
TripAdvisor have on average a 31% share of 5-star reviews, the magnitude of the eect is reasonably
large. However, as we mentioned before, while this result is consistent with manipulation, we can
not rule out the possibility that reviewers on TripAdvisor tend to prefer independent hotels over
branded chain hotels to a bigger extent than Expedia customers.
We also measure the disparity across sites in preferences for hotels with multi-unit owners.
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Consistent with our hypothesis that multi-unit owners will nd review manipulation more costly,
and therefore engage in less review manipulation, we nd that hotels that are owned by a multi-unit
owner have a 3.1 percentage point smaller dierence in the share of 5-star reviews across the two
sites. This translates to about four fewer 5-star reviews on TripAdvisor if we assume that the share
of Expedia reviews stays the same across these two conditions and that the hotel has a total of 120
reviews on TripAdvisor, the site average. While we include neighbor eects in this specication, we
do not have strong hypotheses on the eect of neighbor characteristics on the dierence in the share
of 5-star reviews across the two sites, since there is no apparent incentive for a neighboring hotel
to practice positive manipulation on the focal hotel. Indeed, in the 5-star specication, none of the
estimated neighbor eects are large or statistically signicant. In interpreting these results, it is
important to remember that the ownership characteristic is virtually unobservable to the consumer;
it measures the dierence between, for example, an Archon Hospitality Faireld Inn and an owner-
operator Faireld Inn. Nonetheless, it is plausible that TripAdvisor and Expedia users dierentially
value hotel characteristics that are somehow correlated with the presence of an owner-operator (and
not included in our regression specications). We return to this issue below.
For the 5-star specications, the hotel's own ownership characteristics are the variables of in-
terest, rather than the neighbor variables. Here, we nd the estimated coecients of the neighbor
characteristics to be small and statistically insignicant. This nding is consistent with our ma-
nipulation hypothesis but seems inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis that TripAdvisor and
Expedia users have systematically dierent preferences for hotels with dierent kinds of neighbors.
What do our results suggest about the extent of review manipulation on an open platform such as
TripAdvisor overall? Note that we cannot identify the baseline level of manipulation on TripAdvisor
that is uncorrelated with our characteristics. Thus, we can only provide estimates for the dierence
between hotels of dierent characteristics. However, as an example, let's consider the dierence
in positive manipulation under two extreme cases: a) a branded chain hotel that is owned by a
multi-unit owner (the case with the lowest predicted and estimated amount of manipulation) and
b) an independent hotel that is owned by a small owner (the case with the greatest predicted and
estimated amount of manipulation). Recall that the average hotel in our sample has 120 reviews, of
which 37 on average are 5-star. Our estimates suggest that we would expect about 7 more positive
TripAdvisor reviews in case b versus case a. Similarly, we can perform a comparison for the case
of negative manipulation by neighbors. Consider case c) being a completely isolated hotel and case
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d) being located near an independent hotel that is owned by a small owner. For the average hotel
with 120 reviews, thirty 1-star and 2-star reviews would be expected as a baseline. Our estimates
suggest that there would be a total of 6 more fake negative reviews on TripAdvisor in case d versus
case c.
Our main results focus on the presence of neighbors and the ownership and aliations of hotels
and their neighbors. However, hotels dier structurally not only in their ownership but also in
their management. As explained above, some hotel units have single unit owners, but these owners
outsource day to day management of the hotels to a management company. In our sample of 2931
hotels, of the 2029 that do not have multi-unit owners, 767 do outsource management to multi-unit
managers. As we explain in Section 4, the management company is not residual claimant to hotel
protability the way that the owner is, but nonetheless, obviously has a stake in hotel success. As
in the case of multi-unit owners, posting of fake reviews by an employee of a management company
could, if detected, have negative implications for the management company as a whole. Thus, we
expect that a multi-unit management company would have a lower incentive to post fake reviews
than a single-unit manager (which in many cases is the owner). This implies that hotel neighbors
of hotels with multi-unit managers should have fewer 1- and 2-star reviews on TripAdvisor while
hotels with multi-unit managers should have fewer 5-star reviews on TripAdvisor, once again if we
assume that the share of Expedia reviews stays the same.
In the rst column in Table 5, we use the share dierence in 1- and 2-star reviews as the
dependent variable. Here, as before, we have no predictions for the own hotel characteristics (and
none are statistically dierent from zero). We do have predictions for neighbor characteristics. As
before, we nd that having any neighbor is associated with having more 1- and 2-star reviews, a 3.8
percentage point increase. As before, an independent hotel neighbor is associated with more negative
reviews on TripAdvisor relative to Expedia and having a large owner chain neighbor is associated
with fewer negative reviews on TripAdvisor. The presence of a large management company neighbor
is associated with fewer negative reviews on TripAdvisor, although the eect is not statistically
signicant at standard condence level. The presence of a large owner neighbor and the presence of
a large management company neighbor are quite positively correlated. A test of the joint signicance
shows that the two variables are jointly signicant in our specication at the 1 percent level.
In the second column of Table 5, we examine 5-star reviews. Here, as before, the neighbor
characteristics are uninformative. As before, independent hotels have more 5-star reviews on Tri-
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Table 5: Management Company Specications
Dierence in

























Hotel tier controls? YES YES
Hotel location controls? YES YES






























γj City-level xed eects? YES YES
Num. of observations 2931 2931
R-squared 0.06 0.12
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Regression estimates of Equation (1). The dependent variable in all specications is the share
of reviews that are N star for a given hotel at TripAdvisor minus the share of reviews for that
hotel that are N star at Expedia. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5km radius.
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pAdvisor relative to Expedia and that hotels with a large owner company have fewer 5-star reviews.
In addition, the results show that a hotel that is managed by a multi-unit management company
has a statistically signicant 2.1 percentage point decrease in the dierence of the share of 5-star
reviews between the two sites which we interpret as a decrease in positive manipulation. Notably,
the inclusion of this variable does not alter our previous results; independent hotels continue to have
signicantly more 5-star reviews on TripAdvisor relative to Expedia and hotels with multi-unit own-
ers have fewer 5-star reviews. This result is important because, like a multi-unit owner company,
management by a multi-unit management company is invisible to the consumer. Thus, altogether,
there is suggestive evidence that, like larger owner companies, larger management companies are
associated with less review manipulation.
Unfortunately, it is impossible for us, given these data, to measure the eect that these ratings'
changes will have on sales. While Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) show that 1-star reviews hurt
book sales more than 5-star reviews help book sales, those ndings do not necessarily apply to
this context. Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) note that two competing books on the same subject
may indeed be net complements, rather than net substitutes. Authors and publishers, then, may
gain from posting fake positive reviews of their own books, but will not necessarily benet from
posting negative reviews of rivals' books. Thus, in the context of books, 1-star reviews may be more
credible than 5 star reviews. We have seen that, in the case of hotels, where two hotels proximate
to each other are clearly substitutes, one cannot infer that a 1 or 2 star review should be treated
by customers as more credible than a 5-star review.
5.2 Results for One-Time Reviewers
Our preceding analysis is predicated on the hypothesis that promotional reviewers have an incentive
to imitate real reviewers as completely as possible. This is in contrast to the computer science
literature, described above, that attempts to nd textual markers of fake reviews. Nonetheless,
for robustness, we do separately examine one category of suspicious reviews. These are reviews
that are posted by one-time contributors to TripAdvisor. The least expensive way for a hotel to
generate a user review is to create a ctitious prole on TripAdvisor (which only requires an email
address), and following the creation of this prole, to post a review. This is, of course, not the only
way that the hotel can create reviews. Another option is for a hotel to pay a user with an existing
review history to post a fake review; yet another possibility is to create a review history in order
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to camouage a fake review. Here, we examine suspicious reviews: the review for a hotel is the
rst and only review that the user ever posted. In our sample, 23.0% of all TripAdvisor reviews are
posted by one-time reviewers. These reviews are more likely to be extreme compared to the entire
TripAdvisor sample: 47.6% of one-time reviewers are 5-star versus 38.1% in the entire TripAdvisor
sample. There are more negative outliers as well: 24.3% of one-time reviews are 1-star and 2-star
versus 16.4% in the entire TripAdvisor sample. Of course, the extremeness of one-time reviews does
not in and of itself suggest that one-time reviews are more likely to be fake; users who otherwise do
not make a habit of reviewing may be moved to do so by an unusual experience with a hotel.
In Table 6 we present the results of the following three specications. In the rst column,
we present the results of a specication where the dependent variable is the share of one-time




captures the incidence of these suspicious reviews and includes potential positive as well as negative
manipulation. The most striking result is that one-time reviews are 8.8 percentage points more
common for independent hotels. This is consistent with our earlier results, but also could be
attributable to legitimate customer reviewing preferences. Also consistent with our earlier results,
we nd a negative impact of multi-unit owner on one-time reviewing activity, and a negative impact
of multi-unit owner neighbors. There is one variable in our specication that does not have the
anticipated sign. The presence of any neighbor is negatively associated with suspicious reviews
(although this eect is insignicant); our model would predict that this association would be positive.
The other two specications in Table 6 address the valence of these reviews. For these specica-







. That is, we look at the
dierence between the share of N -star reviews among suspicious reviews on TripAdvisor and the
overall share of N-Star reviews on Expedia. Ideally, we might want to compare one-time reviews
on TripAdvisor to one-time reviews on Expedia. Unfortunately, Expedia's reviewer identication
features render identifying one-time reviewers impossible. Column 2 shows the case where N = 1
or 2, our specication that focuses on the characteristics of neighbor hotels. The presence of a
neighbor is associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the share of one-time reviews that are
1 or 2 stars. This eect is statistically signicant at the ten percent level. The eect of indepen-
dent neighbors and multi-unit neighbors are positive and negative, respectively, in accordance with
our model and previous results. However, these eects are not signicant at standard condence
levels. It is possible that these results are weak in part because one-time reviews are suspicious.
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Num. of observations 2874 2874 2874
R-squared 0.35 0.05 0.07
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Estimation of Equation 1 with the sample restricted to hotels that have at least one review by
a one-time contributor (the reviewer has only submitted one review on TripAdvisor).
The dependent variable in the rst column is the share of reviews by one-time contributors among
all TripAdvisor reviews for a given hotel. The dependent variable in the other two columns is the
share of reviews by one-time contributors that are N star for a given hotel at TripAdvisor minus
the share of reviews for that hotel that are N star at Expedia.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5km radius.
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TripAdvisor has a policy whereby hotels can contest suspicious reviews and TripAdvisor may, at
its discretion, remove contested suspicious reviews from the site. Negative reviews by one-time
reviewers may be more likely to be expunged from the site. In Column 3, we examine 5-star reviews,
the specications in which we focus on own-hotel characteristics. The eect of hotel independence is
positive, as predicted, but not signicantly dierent from zero. Multi-unit owner has a statistically
signicant 2.4 percentage point lower dierence in the share of 5-star reviews across the two sites,
which is consistent with our hypotheses and earlier results.
Overall, these results conrm our prior results that manipulation of reviews takes place in a way
that is consistent with predicted hotel incentives. However, our results for suspicious reviews are
not as compelling as our results for all reviews. Of course, with this analysis we are forced to
construct the left hand side variable using a smaller subset of reviews, which may be noisy. Further,
if fakers are sophisticated in their attempt to avoid detection, they may be avoiding these suspicious
reviewing activities.
5.3 Robustness Checks
Perhaps the main concern with our results is the potential for selection on unobservables. That is,
TripAdvisor and Expedia users may dier in their taste for hotel characteristics. We have included
many such possible characteristics in our specications (hotel age, hotel tier, hotel location type,
etc.). Thus, dierences in tastes for these included characteristics are not a problem for our analy-
sis; we have controlled for these in our specication. However, it is possible that consumer tastes
dier across the two websites for unobservable characteristics. This is a concern if the unobservable
characteristics are correlated with the ownership, aliation, and neighbor variables of interest. This
could in principle lead to signicant measured impacts of our ownership, aliation, and neighbor
variables even if ownership, aliation, and neighbor characteristics are not associated with review
manipulation. A priori, we nd this alternative hypothesis less plausible for any specications in
which the variables of interest are neighbor variables. It seems unlikely, for example, that Tri-
pAdvisor users systematically dislike (relative to Expedia users) hotels whose hotel neighbors are
franchisees that operate a single hotel. A priori, we nd selection on unobservables to be a more
plausible concern for specications in which the variables of interest are own-hotel ownership and
aliation.
To investigate selection on unobservables, we undertake the following exercise. Recall that our
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base specications include a rich set of control variables. We re-estimate the base specications in
Table 4, maintaining the neighbor, ownership, and aliation variables but removing all of the control
variables. We compare the result of this no-controls specication to our basic results including all of
the control variables. We examine how much (if at all) inclusion of the control variables attenuates
the coecients for the variables of interest. If unobservable characteristics are positively correlated
with observable characteristics, one might expect that the inclusion of additional controls, if they
were available, would further attenuate the coecients on the variables of interest.14 The no-
control specications are shown in Columns 1 through 3 of Table 7. Comparing Table 4 to Table
7, for the neighbor specication shown in Column 1, reestimation excluding all control variables
actually produces a smaller point estimate of the neighbor eect. Thus, inclusion of a set of control
variables does not attenuate the results at all. This nding has been interpreted in the literature
as assuaging concerns about selection on unobservables. Similarly, the full neighbor ownership-
aliation specication in Column 2 of Table 4 can be compared with the specications with no
control variables in Table 7. The independent neighbor variable has a stronger measured impact
on review dierences in the regression with the controls versus the regression without controls.
Again, inclusion of controls does not attenuate the independence eect. The owner-neighbor eect
does attenuate from -0.031 to -0.025 with the inclusion of the control variables. However, our
specications contain a very rich set of control variables. If we could hypothetically perform a
regression that contained all of the unobservables, and if these unobservables were as powerful as
the observable control variables in attenuating the ownership eect, the ownership eect would still
remain substantial in magnitude. Thus, for the neighbor specications in Columns 1 and 2 of Table
4, we conclude that selection on unobservables is unlikely to be a major explanation for our results.
A priori, selection on unobservables is more plausible for the ve star specications examining
a hotel's own characteristics. Own hotel ownership and aliation are plausibly correlated with
characteristics that TripAdvisor and Expedia customers could value dierently. Again, we examine
this issue by comparing the no controls specications in Column 3 of Table 7 to the full controls
specications in Column 3 of Table 4. Here, the alternative hypothesis of selection on unobservables
is more dicult to reject. Both the multi-unit owner dummy and the independent hotel dummy
are attenuated by approximately 50% when controls are added to the regression. Thus, our in-
terpretation of these coecients as evidence for review manipulation relies on the included hotel
14See Altonji et al. (2005) for a more formal discussion of this test.
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R-squared 0.001 0.01 0.04
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Estimation of Equation 1 excluding control variables.
The dependent variable in all specications is the share of reviews that are N star for a given hotel
at TripAdvisor minus the share of reviews that are N star at Expedia.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5 km radius.
Results in this Table can be compared to the base specications in Table 4 to measure
whether and if the inclusion of control variables in Table 4 leads to substantial
attenuation of the coecients of interest.
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characteristics being more powerful than omitted hotel characteristics in explaining the dierence
in reviewer behavior on TripAdvisor and Expedia.
Our analysis of Table 7 is one strategy to examine the importance of omitted hotel characteristics.
In Appendix Table 11, we take another approach to examining omitted hotel characteristics. Here,
we reexamine the base specications of Table 4, including hotel chain xed eects for the ten largest
hotel brands. Inclusion of these chain xed eects allows TripAdvisor and Expedia patrons to have
a very general form of dierent preferences. They can have not only dierent preferences for hotel
quality tiers and hotel age (all included in the controls in our base specications), but also can
have dierent preferences for dierent individual hotel brands. These specications produce results
very similar to the base specications discussed in 4. Here, the neighbor variables of interest are
all of roughly the same magnitude and signicance as in our base specications. The only change
that inclusion of this variable causes compared to the earlier results is that the independent own
hotel dummy in the 5-star specication is no longer statistically signicant; the ownership variable
remains of the expected sign and statistically signicantly dierent from zero.
Given the importance of our negative review specications, we next turn to a few robustness
checks that examine the robustness of our neighbor ownership and aliation results. Throughout,
we have used 1 and 2 star reviews as our marker of negative reviews. We chose this specication
in part due to the summary statistics outlined in Table 1. While 31% of reviews on TripAdvisor
are 5s, 1s and 2s together only account for 25% of reviews. Hence, a rm attempting to denigrate
its competitor will often be able to do so eectively with either 1- or 2-star promotional reviews.
Furthermore, a scan of web blogs, etc. suggests that hoteliers complain to TripAdvisor about fake
2-star negative reviews from competitors and that TripAdvisor has sometimes deemed such reviews
as fake and removed them.15 Nonetheless, we provide robustness results where we examine the basic
specication in Equation 1 above, but consider only determinants of 1-star reviews. This is shown
in the rst column of Table 8. The results are similar to the base 1- and 2-star results in Column
2 of Table 4; the own-hotel ownership and aliation characteristics have little explanatory power
and are insignicant. The independent neighbor and large company owner neighbor coecients are
similar in magnitude and signicance to the main specication. The having any neighbor within
0.5km indicator variable has a smaller coecient (although still of the hypothesized sign) but is
not statistically signicant at standard condence levels.
15See, for example, Fake Review Number Two in http://TripAdvisorwatch.wordpress.com/trip-advisor-fake-
reviews/.
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YES YES YES YES
Num. of
observations
2931 2931 2931 2931
Neighbor
radius?
0.5km 0.3km 0.7km 0.9km
R-squared 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Estimation of Equation (1). The dependent variable in all specications is the share of reviews that
are N star for a given hotel at TripAdvisor minus the share of reviews that are N star at Expedia.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. The radius for which neighbors are
calculated for a given hotel is given in the table.33
We also examine the robustness of our results by altering the radius that we use to dene
neighbors. In our base specications in Table 4, we dene a neighbor as a hotel that is very close
to the hotel of interest within 0.5km kilometer of the hotel of interest. Under this denition, 76%
of the hotels in our sample have a neighbor. In Columns 2 through 4 of Table 8 we re-estimate the
specication of Column 2 of Table 4, but using dierent radii to dene neighbors 0.3km, 0.7km,
and 0.9km. Under the narrower radius denition of 0.3km, 65% of hotels have a neighbor. Under
the wider radius denitions of 0.7km and 0.9km, 82% and 85% of the hotels in our sample have
a neighbor, respectively. These varying radii specications are similar to our base specication.
As the radius widens, the dummy for having any neighbor appears to diminish in magnitude and
signicance (as nearly every hotel has a neighbor), while the neighbor characteristics maintain or
even increase explanatory power. Thus, we conclude that our results change with the radius size in
a sensible way.
Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to our particular choices of review site. Speci-
cally, we examine the relationship between our results and the results that would obtain by replacing
the data from Expedia analyzed above with data from another site, Orbitz.com. Orbitz.com, like
Expedia, is primarily a travel booking site that hosts user reviews. Orbitz is a less popular site
than Expedia; Orbitz had approximately 60 percent fewer page views than Expedia in 2012.16 In
addition, whereas we expect there to be a large overlap between TripAdvisor and Expedia audiences
due to the companies' co-marketing eorts at the time of data collection (see our discussion above),
we do not have the same expectations for TripAdvisor and Orbitz.
Until late 2010, Orbitz, like Expedia, only accepted reviews from individuals who had booked
their stay at Orbitz.com. Starting in late 2010, Orbitz allowed others to submit hotel reviews,
but reviews from veried customers are identied as Veried and are given higher weight in
calculating the Orbitz Reviewer Score for each property. Here we use only veried reviews from
Orbitz. In our sample, only 1.2% of Orbitz reviews were unveried. Hence, while the Orbitz data
is not a perfect substitute for Expedia data due to Orbitz's hybrid model, its smaller size, and the
fact that there may sharper dierences between TripAdvisor and Orbitz reviewer preferences, we
expect that Orbitz's veried reviews are costlier to manipulate than TripAdvisor's reviews. If our
results are driven by important (and subtle) dierences between the customer pools at Expedia and
TripAdvisor, robustness of our results for Orbitz may be valuable.
16Data from ComScore, found at http://www.newmediatrendwatch.com/markets-by-country/17-usa/126-online-
travel-market, accessed April 11, 2013.
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In particular, in January 2013, a little more than a year after the original sample was collected,
we obtained TripAdvisor and Orbitz reviews for the hotels in our original sample.17 For our hotels
in the 2013 sample, we have a total of 105,232 veried Orbitz reviews; in contrast the number of
TripAdvisor reviews is 486,769. Summary statistics are shown in Table 9. One characteristic of
Orbitz reviews that stands out is the relatively low share of 5- star reviews.






= XijB1 + OwnAf ijB2 + Nei ijB3+
NeiOwnAf ijB4 +
∑
γj + εij (2)
These results are reported in Table 10. This analysis repeats the regression specications of Table 4,
replacing Orbitz veried reviews with Expedia reviews. Regressions results are qualitatively similar
to the results found in Table 4. Turning to the 1- and 2-star reviews, we nd, as in Table 4, the own
hotel owner characteristics are small and insignicant. However, we also nd small and insignicant
hotel neighbor eects. Note that the neighbor eects are all in the hypothesized direction. As in
Table 4, we nd that independent hotels have more 5-star reviews on TripAdvisor versus Orbitz,
and hotels from large ownership entities have fewer 5-star reviews. In the Orbitz specication, the
magnitude of the independence eect is somewhat larger than in our Expedia specications, while
the magnitude and signicance of the multi-unit owner eect is smaller (albeit the eect is still
signicant at 10% signicance). Overall, we take these results as suggestive that our ndings our
robust when examining alternative sites.
6 Conclusion and Limitations
We propose a novel methodology for empirically detecting review manipulation. In particular, we
examine the dierence in review distributions across Expedia and TripAdvisor, sites with dierent
17The reason behind the later data collection eort is that Orbitz had relatively few reviews in October of 2011:
1) there were 104 hotels that had reviews at TripAdvisor and Expedia but no reviews on Orbitz, and 2) for the
hotels with reviews at both Orbitz and TripAdvisor, the number of reviews at Orbitz was about three-quarters of the
number of Expedia reviews. Unfortunately, during our later data collection eort we also discovered that Expedia
had expanded its reviews in a way that compromised our identication eort. In March of 2012, they merged their
original database of veried reviews with reviews from other sites. Since we could not ascertain that all the new
reviews had been veried in the same manner as the earlier reviews, we could not re-do the analysis with the more
recent Expedia data. Note, however, that the change took place after our original sample was collected.
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193.78 261.66 1 2468
Number of Orbitz
reviews
41.89 62.68 1 1077
Average TripAdvisor
star rating
3.61 0.70 1 5
Average Orbitz star
rating







Share of Orbitz 1-star
reviews
0.10






Share of Orbitz 5-star
reviews
0.23
Total number of hotels 2512
The sample consists of the subset of hotels in our base sample that 1) were also available on
TripAdvisor and Orbitz in January 2013, and 2) had at least one review on TripAdvisor and
one veried review on Orbitz at that time.
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Table 10: TripAdvisor versus Orbitz Results
Dierence in share
of 1- and 2-star
reviews
Dierence in share
of 1- and 2-star
reviews
Dierence in share
of 5- star reviews































































Num. of observations 2512 2512 2281
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.07
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5km radius.
Regression estimates of Equation (2). The dependent variable in all specications is the share of reviews
that are N star for a given hotel at TripAdvisor minus the share of reviews for that hotel that are N star
at Orbitz. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
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reviewer identity verication policies, and across dierent competitive/ownership conditions. Con-
sistent with our theoretical claims, we nd that an increase in hotel incentives to manipulate reviews
results in an increase in our measures of manipulation. Substantively, we nd that independent ho-
tels engage in more review manipulation (both positive and negative), while hotels with multi-unit
owners as well as hotels that are managed by a multi-unit management companies engage in less
review manipulation (in the former case we nd the eect for positive and negative manipulation,
while in the latter we nd the eect only in the case of positive manipulation). Thus, we con-
clude from our results that promotional reviewing is suciently economically important that actors
that are dierentially situated economically will indulge in promotional reviewing to a measurably
dierent extent.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on incentives and organizational form. Our unusually
rich data set allows us to exploit the fact that ownership patterns in the hotel industry are actually
quite complicated. For example, as discussed previously, a hotel can be franchised to a quite
large franchisee company; we hypothesize that the large franchisee company is less incentivized to
engage in this type of fraudulent activity than a small franchisee. In our paper, we advance the
literature on ownership by utilizing data on these complex ownership structures. We show that
larger organizations appear to be measurably better at curbing cheating.
While is it not our primary goal, our paper also contributes to the literature on fake review
detection. Previous methodologies in the computer science literature infer that reviews are more
likely to be fake if they contain certain textual markers of fakery (such as not using spatial language).
We have noted that a concern with these methodologies is that manipulating the textual markers
in response to detection algorithms is relatively inexpensive. In contrast, the organization form of
a hotel and its neighbors are very dicult to alter. Our results suggest that a detection algorithm
could incorporate these factors in assessing the probability that a given review is fake.
Our paper also has implications for user review system design. Our results suggest that pro-
motional reviews are less common on Expedia than on TripAdvisor. Thus, the policy of verifying
reviews does limit promotional reviews. However, this limitation comes at a cost: there are far fewer
reviews on Expedia than on TripAdvisor. While the policy used by Orbitz (and now Amazon) of
marking veried and unveried reviews is an interesting compromise, it may discourage unveried
reviews and does not fully solve the review site's problem of whether to fully incorporate unveried
reviews into summary data.
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There are a number of limitations of this work. Perhaps the biggest limitation is that we do not
observe manipulation directly but must infer it. This issue is of course inherent in doing research in
this area. In the paper we deal with this limitation by building a strong case that the eects that
we examine are due to review manipulation and not due to other unobserved factors. The second
important limitation is that our measure of review manipulation does not include any content
analysis. That is, one could imagine that one way in which a hotel could increase the impact of a
fake review is by making particularly strong claims in the text of the review. For example, to hurt a
competitor, a traveler could claim to have witnessed a bed bug infestation. This is an interesting
issue for future work.
Another limitation of this work is that we are unable to measure the impact that this ma-
nipulation has on consumer purchase behavior. Do consumers somehow detect and discount fake
reviews? Do they discount all reviews to some extent? Do they make poor choices on the basis of
fake reviews? These questions are also left for future work.
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7 Appendix
7.1 A Simple Model
We propose a very simple and stylized model to x ideas. The game consists of two competing
rms, A and B, and a continuum of consumers. The time line of the game is the following:
1. Stage I : Nature draws the true quality of each rm (qA and qB). We assume that the rms'
true quality is not observable to any of the game's players.18 The prior belief on the rm
qualities are: qA ∼ Normal(q0, σ2q ) and qB ∼ Normal(q0, σ2q ). Here, the two rms a priori
are identically distributed, but the model can be easily generalized to the case where the prior
means are not equal. Unless otherwise noted, we assume that all other parameters of the
model are common knowledge.
2. Stage II : The rms set prices (pA and pB), which are observed by all the players.
3. Stage III : Each rm can surreptitiously (and simultaneously) manufacture positive reviews
for itself and negative reviews for its competitor. The reviews are posted by a third party
platform that does not verify the reviewers' identity. That is, consumers can not dierentiate
between real and manufactured (or biased) user reviews. We denote by ei,i the eort that
rm i invests into positive self-promotion (manufactured positive reviews), and by ei,j the
eort that rm i invests into negative reviews for rm j. While the actual rms' eorts are
not observed by the consumers, consumers do observe the user ratings for both rms. Hence
we can think of the set of user ratings (which consists of real and fake reviews) providing a
signal to the consumer on the rm's true quality. In particular, the signals arising from user
ratings are the following:
sA =qA + eA,A − eB,A (3)
sB =qB + eB,B − eA,B (4)
That is, the signal generated from user reviews on rm A's quality consists of the true quality
(qA), the positive self-promotion eort by rm A (eA,A) and the negative eort by its com-
petitor (eB,A). Note that while we model the benet of eort (the signal generated from user
18The case where only rms, but not the consumers, observe each other's true quality yields similar results, but is
considerably more complicated.
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Table 11: Chain Fixed Eects Robustness Check
Dierence in share
of 1- and 2-star
reviews
Dierence in share
of 1- and 2-star
reviews
Dierence in share
of 5- star reviews


































































Num. of observations 2931 2931 2931
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.13
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
All neighbor eects calculated for 0.5km radius.
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reviews) as linear in the self-promotion eort for the sake of simplicity, in reality the benet
is more likely to be concave in eort. That is, since a rating can't be higher than 5-stars, an
increase in the number of manufactured positive reviews is likely to have diminishing marginal
returns. Similarly, since a competitor's rating can't be lower than 1 star, an increase in the
number of manufactured negative reviews is likely to have diminishing marginal returns.
4. We model the manipulation eort as costly to the rm. We can think of this cost as the cost
of eort associated with writing fake reviews as well as reputation-related risks associated
with this kind of promotion. That is, if the rm is caught doing this kind of activity, it will
suer damage to its reputation, which may dier for dierent types of rms. We assume
that the cost of writing reviews is a convex function of the eort. That is, consider the
cost of writing the rst manufactured review to the cost of writing the 30th review. While
the rst review can reect the owner's own authentic writing style, the 30th review must be
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Here δi signies the damage caused to the rm i if it caught doing self-promotion, and γi the
damage if it is posting negative reviews for its competitor.
5. Stage IV : Finally, the consumer chooses the product that maximizes her utility. We assume
that the products are horizontally dierentiated. We use a simple Hotelling model of dier-
entiation to model consumer choice, where rm A is located at x = 0, rm B is located at
x = 1, and the consumer at location x chooses A if
E[qA|sA]− tx− pA ≥E[qB|sB]− tx− pB (5)
We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Since consumers
do not observe the true quality directly, their expected utility from A and B is inferred from
the signals generated from user reviews.
We next solve for the rms' optimal actions by backward induction. We start with the consumer's
inference in stage 4. After observing the signal sA and sB, the consumers' posterior beliefs on the
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rms' qualities are:
E[qA|sA] = (1− µs)q0 + µs(sA − ê∗A,A + ê∗B,A) (6)






(0 < µs < 1) is the optimal weight that the consumer puts on the rms'
reviews, and ê∗A,A and ê
∗
B,A are the inferred equilibrium eort levels since the consumer does not
observe the rms' manipulation activity directly.
Assuming market coverage, the consumer who is indierent between the two products is located





E[qA|sA]− E[qB|sB] + pB − pA
2t
(8)
Hence, the market shares of rms A and B are x̂ and 1 − x̂, respectively. This implies the
following prot functions for rms A and B, respectively in stage 3:




































Substituting (6) and (7) into (9) and (10), and taking the expectation, we can re-write the rms'
maximization problem as the following:





































where cA = −eB,A − eB,B + ê∗B,A + ê∗B,B and cB = −eA,B − eA,A + ê∗A,B + ê∗A,A. Proposition 1
below presents the optimal manipulation levels for the rms:
Proposition 1. In stage 3 (after the rms have committed to prices pA and pB), the optimal















Proof. To solve for the optimal promotional levels, we 1) derive the rst order conditions of rm
A's prot function by dierentiating Equation (11) with respect to eA,A and eA,B and by dier-
entiating Equation (12) with respect to eB,B and eB,A, and 2) simultaneously solve the system of













The Corollary below summarizes several key results that we will use in our empirical analysis:
Corollary 1. The following results are implied by Proposition 1:













2) Firms engage in negative manipulation of reviews of their competitors: e∗A,B > 0 and e
∗
B,A > 0,
and this activity increases as the costs of manipulation decrease. Hence, a rm that is located close
to a competitor will have more negative reviews than a rm has no close competitors (which will
have no fake negative reviews), and the number of fake negative reviews is greater if the competitor
has lower costs of manipulation.
Finally, we turn to the eect that review manipulation has on consumer choice. In the basic
model consumer can invert the rm's problem and perfectly discounts the amount of manipulation.














B,A. Since fake reviews
are perfectly discounted, the consumer would make the same choices in the current setting where
fake reviews are possible and in one where fake reviews are not possible. Despite the fact that fake
reviews do not aect consumer choices in equilibrium, rms prefer to post reviews. That is, if the
rm chooses not to engage in manipulation, the consumer who expects fake reviews will think that
the rm is terrible.
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While Corollary 1 is derived assuming exogenous prices, the comparative statics are qualitatively
similar under endogenous prices, which are set in the second stage. As we argue above, the rm does
not expect manipulation to change its market share in expectation, given the optimal discounting
by the consumer. Hence, the maximization problem in the second stage is the following








































After the appropriate substitutions (Proposition 1 provides e∗A,A, etc.), taking the rst order condi-






12t2δAγAδBγB + 4µ2st [(γA + δA)δBγB + (γB + δB)δAγA] + µ
4







12t2δAγAδBγB + 4µ2st [(γA + δA)δBγB + (γB + δB)δAγA] + µ
4
s [(γA + δA)(δB + γB)]
(18)
For simplicity, let's assume that δA = γA ≡ ρ and δB = γB ≡ 1. We can show that an increase in
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